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Political attention in Europe and the US to the problem of energy security has signiﬁcantly
diminished, and there is more to this shift that just the impact of ﬁnancial crisis in the EU
and the effect of the ‘shale gas revolution’. In the middle of the past decade, some
fundamental decisions were made in the European Commission regarding the liberaliza-
tion and diversiﬁcation of the energy supplies, but the economic underpinning of these
decisions has vastly changed. The whole set of energy directive is now pointing in the
wrong direction, but rethinking of past mistakes is lagging, so the energy policy is left in its
bureaucratic ‘box’. Russia is set to remain locked in the European gas market but is very
slow in adapting to the changes in it. Both Russia and the EU remain in denial that the time
for their energy-geopolitical games is over as the nexus of energy ﬂows is fast shifting to
Asia-Paciﬁc.
Copyright  2012, Asia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Hanyang University. Production and
hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
The issue of securing reliable energy supplies for the fast-
expanding global demand has until recently appeared
a deﬁnite political priority and a rewarding target for
academic research for years to come. William Blake’s beau-
tiful line– ‘Energy is eternal delight’ – inspiredmanya clever
word-producer and as many a paper-pushing bureaucrat.
The choice of arguments in support of focusing attention on
this seemingly inexhaustible problem was appealinglyarch Center, Hanyang
sia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Hawide: From scarcity of oil to evil intentions of key suppliers.
Yet the intensity of discussions on thewhole range of related
matters that are supposed to have direct and sustained
impact upon national security of every established and
emerging global power has distinctly slackened since the
start of this decade. The topic has gone out of vogue in the
research projects advanced by the most political weather
sensitive think-tanks, from CER and IISS in London and CSIS
andBrookings inWashington to the one inwhich this author
has been fund-raising for the past 20 years.
Such attention swings are a norm in the ever-changing
ﬁeld of political fashion, but there may be more to the
de-prioritization of energy than just exhaustion of themain
lines of analysis. From a purely pragmatic point of view, one
would expect the thinking efforts to follow the oscillations
in the notoriously unpredictable global energy market, but
the current dissipation of interest happens while the oil
prices stay on the elevated plateau of about $US 100 per
barrel – and it has not been reignited by the spectacular andnyang University. Production and hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
4 The power of this old idea is perceptible from a visit to the ‘American
Energy Independence’website (http://www.americanenergyindependence.
com/home.aspx); for a devastating criticism see Bruce (2008).
5 A useful overview of the energy-related debates at that time can be
found in Kalicki and Goldwyn (2005).
6 The high point of ‘energy dialogue’ was the US-Russia Commercial
Energy Summit in Houston, as presented in the Baker Institute Study 21
(February 2003, accessible at http://www.rice.edu/energy/publications/
PolicyReports/study_21.pdf). I examined the rise of the ‘energy super-
power’ idea in Baev (2008).
7 This poorly legitimized persecution continues to bedevil Russian
politics; current developments can be followed at the Khodorkovsky’s
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start of 2011. The new economic reality that takes shape as
the severe crisis of 2007–2009 comes back with vengeance
centered on the EU ﬁnancial mechanism determines the
muddle in political guidelines-drawing. The money ﬂows is
now the main source of anxiety, but a re-examination of
the hype and fuss over the generally unexciting matters of
prospecting for, and transporting of hydrocarbons might
yield some useful lessons.
The great concentration of political efforts on regulating
the energy business, which has produced few positive
results, could be taken for a case demonstrating the work-
ings of the ‘securitization’ theory formulated by Ole
Wæver’s ‘Copenhagen school’ back in the mid-1990s.1 His
idea about the political mechanics of elevating an issue from
its normal context and making it into a national security
concern, to which common economic or any other sense
doesn’t apply, is indeed elegant and has more explanatory
value than most politicians are prepared to admit. There is,
however, far more to the making and un-making of energy
security than a ‘speech act’, and the interplay between
national, trans-national, and international actors involved in
the deceivingly simple demand-supply balancing act is too
complex to ﬁt into any theoretical framework.
This article will not attempt to conceptualize the energy
policy-making but will aim at examining the evolution of
its elevation to the national security plane supporting each
distinct phase with a mini-case study.
2. The early 2000s: interplay of diverging oil interests
It was hard to imagine in the late 1990s, when oil prices
‘recovered’ to about $US 20 per barrel and demand in Asia
and in Russia was still depressed by the contraction caused
by the now overshadowed ﬁnancial crisis, that energy
could become a major security concern.2 Yet ten years later,
the discourse of ‘energy security’ was so ﬁrmly entrenched
that experts treated oil- and gas-related issues as naturally
belonging to the domain of national security and consti-
tuting a major source of conﬂict in the international
system.3 Another ﬁve years later, the dogmas of ‘energy
security’ are not challenged as departing from the real
content of international relations but rather relegated to
the ‘no-action-required’ category.
Taking a step back from the current lull in the debates
and their recent blossoming, it is possible to establish that
the crucial event in propelling the ‘energy security’ theme
to the top of the list of political mega-problems was the
terrorist attack universally known by the numerals ‘9/11’.
There is no need to elaborate on the transformative impact
of that act of unconventional war on the US foreign policy
making but the impact on the energy business is far less
obvious. The shocking attack added a new twist to the old1 The fundamental work on this theory is Buzan, Wæver, and De Wilde
(1998). Personally, I like best his chapter ‘Imperial Metaphors: Emerging
European Analogies to Pre-Nation-State Imperial Systems’ in Tunander,
Baev, and Einagel (1997, pp. 59–93).
2 One perceptive analysis from that time is Morse (1999).
3 One academically accomplished protagonist of resource conﬂict is
Michael Klare (2008).US longing for ‘energy independence’ focusing it on the
security risks coming from the massive transfer of wealth
to the Arab monarchies and dictatorships.4 The urge to
break this trend was a factor in the disastrous decision to
invade Iraq, which caused serious distortions in the energy
markets driving fast climb of the oil prices. This unintended
consequence carried the debates a step further sharpening
interest in and demands for alternative and renewable
sources of fuel. The ‘green agenda’ had uniquely high
proﬁle in the 2004 US presidential elections, and the defeat
shifted its momentum toward Europe, as symbolized by the
awarding of the 2007 Nobel Peace Prize to Al Gore.5
Another actor that discovered the value of ‘securitizing’
the energy business in the ﬁrst half of 2000s was Russia
where President Vladimir Putin was reshaping Yeltsin’s
political heritage into a tightly centralized system of
bureaucratic control. Initially, he entertained ideas about
an ‘energy dialog’ with the US, but the steady increase of
export revenues allowed him to set the more ambitious
goal of building an ‘energy super-power’.6 The turning
point was the brutal Kremlin attack on the top Russian oil
company Yukos resulting in its expropriation and impris-
onment of its owner Mikhail Khodorkovsky.7 Continuing
inﬂow of Western money convinced Putin in the great
beneﬁt of control over the energy sector and in Russia’s
irreducible advantage as the major supplier of hydrocar-
bons, so he made the ‘energy security’ topic one of the key
issues of his much-valued chairmanship in the G8 in 2006.8
Characteristically, the OPEC – the usual suspect in
making oil into a ‘weapon’ – did not play any noticeable
role in deﬁning the hypothetic supply shortages as security
concern focusing instead on the usual technicalities of
quota distribution but adjusting its perceptions of ‘fair’ oil
price from the modest $US 20–25 per barrel to the more
interesting ﬁgure of $US 50. China was also carefully
securing long-term sources of supply, ﬁrst of all in Africa,
for its growing oil demand without making any fuss about
it.9 It was the cumulative even if totally uncoordinated
effort of interventionists (as well as neo-cons in and around
the ﬁrst Bush administration), environmentalists (gravi-
tating more to the Democratic party) and ‘peak-oil’website (http://www.khodorkovsky.ru/). The impact on the Russian
energy policy is examined in Sixsmith (2010).
8 The Global Energy Security Action Plan approved at the G8 Strelna
summit was appropriately full of wishful thinking on harmonizing the
‘security of supply’ with ‘security of demand’ and forgotten in the matter
of a few months; see Lesage, Van Der Graff, Westphal (2009).
9 International Energy Agency in its World Energy Outlook, 2007 made
a good assessment of China’s steady growth impact on the oil market,
getting most other impact factors seriously wrong.
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‘energy security’ issue in the early 2000s. The real winner,
however, was Putin’s clan of siloviki, who successfully
converted their new access to political power into control
over major oil and gas assets that were allegedly too
important for national security to be left in private hands.2.1. Case 1: the Caspian mediocre game
The ﬁrst phase of the intense geopolitical intrigue
centered on the hydrocarbon resources of the Caspian Sea
that acquired the catchy name ‘New Great Game’ devel-
oped in the second half of the 1990s on the gloomy
background of the ﬁrst Chechen war. It was the breath-
takingly risky decision taken in late 1994 by a consortium
of international ‘majors’ led by the BP to develop three off-
shore oil-ﬁelds in Azerbaijan that became the opening
move in this game, which was theorized and popularized
by no one else but Zbigniew Brzezinski.10 In hindsight, that
decision appears going strictly against the prescriptions of
common economic sense shaped at that time by the low
and falling oil prices, but it has certainly paid a healthy
dividend.11
What is more relevant for this analysis, is the second
phase of the ‘game’ in the ﬁrst half of the 2000s, when
anxieties about rising oil prices blendedwith worries about
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and produced a Caspian
‘energy security’ frenzy.12 Western debates on containing
Russia’s presumed stratagem for abusing control over oil
transit routes were centered on the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
(BTC) pipeline built by the same consortium of ‘majors’
led by BP. That problem-loaded construction was seen as
a crucial game-changer in the Caucasus, and its completion
in 2005 was trumpeted as a major Western geopolitical
achievement that would secure democratic transformation
of the region exempliﬁed by the revolution in Georgia in
late 2003.13 It was a matter of little import for the believers
in oil geopolitics that Russia wasn’t that upset by the BTC
and didn’t try to sabotage it merely pointing out that far
greater volumes of oil from Kazakhstanwere evacuated via
Novorossiysk, while the Atasu-Alashankou pipeline began
to deliver Caspian oil to China.14
It was the Russian-Georgian war in the ﬁrst week of
August 2008 that revealed the shallowness of ‘securitiza-
tion’ of Caspian hydrocarbons. Against the logic of the
‘game’, Moscow took great care not to inﬂict any damage to
the BTC and the parallel Baku-Tbilisi-Erzerum gas pipeline,
implicitly emphasizing that energy business should not be
enmeshed in local wars. It became apparent that Azerbaijan10 His book The Grand Chess-Board (Brzezinski, 1997) made a profound
Realpolitik impact on the political thinking in and about the Caspian
region.
11 On the rationale of that gamble, see Olsen (2004).
12 One example of deliberate over-dramatizing of this theme is
Kellerman (2003).
13 The best example of this triumphalism is Fredrick Starr and Cornell
(2005).
14 On the performance of the Tengiz-Novorossiysk pipeline, see
Dellecker (2008). On the current plans to double its capacity, see Leonard
(2011). On the China connection, see Sukhanov (2005).enriched by the oil revenues did not become a pro-Western
state but turned into a petro-monarchy where opposition
was effectively suppressed until – as the ‘Arab spring’ has
shown – a revolution would expel the corrupt despot. In
fact, the only real security impact of the inﬂow of oil money
is the increasing risk of a new war over Nagorno Karabakh
as Azerbaijan is trying to buy a combat-capable army (Barry,
2011). This would be a hard blow to the expectations of BP,
Statoil and other partners (including KazMunaiGaz and
Lukoil) that pipelines and terminals could work as normal
business enterprises without any added geopolitical load.3. The late 2000s: Russian gas as a key European
security issue
It does not take a conspiratorial mind to assume that the
sharp escalation of European debates on energy security
matters in the second half of past decade was more than
just an over-reaction to the Russian–Ukrainian gas quarrels,
but a conscious choice driven by a combined effort of
several major interest groups. In hindsight, it is possible to
deduce that neither of those interests was successfully
advanced, albeit hardly due to insufﬁcient mobilization of
political effort. The content of energy interests of key
players turned out to be diverging and even incompatible,
and none of them had been able to achieve a clean victory
before the economic crisis, which has devalued the relative
gains and aggravated the losses.
Two major shifts in the character of ‘securitization’ of
energy matters happened in the middle of the past decade:
the rise of natural gas instead of habitual oil as the most
politically prominent type of energy, and the key role of the
European Union rather than the US in shaping the debates.
The event that precipitated both shifts was the one-day
interruption of the ﬂow of Russian gas through the Ukrai-
nian pipelines in the ﬁrst day of 2006, which in retrospect
can be deﬁned as a ‘skirmish’ rather than ‘war’.15 No
damage was done to European consumers, but politicians
and public were alarmed by the proven possibility of
deliberate shutdown of crucial energy supply. A resourceful
lobby consisting of East-Central European politicians with
their pronounced Russian phobias and US neo- and arch-
conservatives pursuing the agenda of restoring American
leadership sprung to life and out-cried the sober experts,
particularly in Germany.16
The European Commission was quick to see in the noisy
debates on energy risks an opportunity to shape a common
energy policy, which it had never been able to formulate
before, and issued already in mid-2006 the Green Paper,
which prescribed greater orientation of member-states
policies toward common goals.17 The two key guidelines
hidden among a great many ‘positive’ words were ‘diver-
siﬁcation’ and ‘liberalization’, and each contained an un-
spelled but clearly implied task going beyond the limits15 A soberview in themultitudeofvariouslybiased reports isGuillet (2007).
16 This burst of activity is evaluated in Casier (2011).
17 The document entitled ‘A European Strategy for Sustainable,
Competitive and Secure Energy’ is available at (http://ec.europa.eu/
energy/strategies/2006/2006_03_green_paper_energy_en.htm).
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did notmean that Spain or Italy should import less gas from
North Africa but set the general aim for the EU to reduce
dependency upon Russian gas due to political unreliability
of this supplier.18 Liberalization involved only limited
action against the interests of European energy ‘champions’
and a determined effort aimed at reducing Gazprom’s
access to and expansion in the EU energy market.19 With
the adoption of these guidelines, the EU–Russia energy
dialogue arrived into a blind-alley.20
Russia certainly made a major contribution to this
renewed and refocused ‘securitization’ of energy despite its
frequent protestations against mixing oil and gas business
with politics. In fact, this business became of such great
personal importance to (then and soon again) President
Vladimir Putin that it was impossible to say whether gas
export was a key instrument for advancing foreign policy
interests, or diplomacy was a means to achieving gas-
centered ambitions.21 Every step made by Gazprom in
building partnership with ENI, or E.ON, or Gaz de France
enjoyed the privilege of presidential support, and so by
deﬁnition was a matter of Russia’s national security. The
main attention, however, was focused on minimizing the
leverage of transit countries, including by building the
controversial Nord Stream gas pipeline across the Baltic
Sea.22 It was exactly in this political terrain that the next
major energy crisis happened – the Russian–Ukrainian ‘gas
war’ of January 2009 – and it propelled the ‘securitization’
of European energy agenda to an all-times-high.23
There is hardly any need in revisiting that failure of gas
diplomacy but it is important to establish that in parallel
with the escalation of tensions in energy trade, another
track of ‘securitization’ reached full capacity at that time –
and it had nothing to do with Russia. Environmental
interest groups were a serious political force, particularly in
Germany, for many years but in the mid-2000s, they
ganged together in the campaign against ‘global warming’
– and were able to make a big difference in shaping the EU
energy policy. The key to that success was not the
persuasive power of inherently inconclusive (and much
abused) scientiﬁc data but the understanding in the Euro-
pean Commission that regulating carbon emissions could
be a useful instrument of power. Already in March 2007,
a new ‘Energy Policy for Europe’ was legislated by the
European Parliament, then detailed in the Action Plan and
elaborated in the ‘Strategic Energy Review’ (2008) and in
a range of speciﬁc directives.2418 One example of the fast-expanded literature on this subject is Larsson
(2006).
19 A sharply critical evaluation ofGazprom’s performance is Åslund (2010).
20 Noteworthy collection of analyses on this problem is Barysch (2008).
21 Good reading on this fusion of interests is Dellecker and Gomart
(2011); see also Milov (2008).
22 A typical alarmist perspective from conservative US think-tank is
Cohen (2006).
23 One quick and precise assessment is Blakey and Gustafson (2009); my
analysis is in Baev (2010a).
24 These documents are available at the European Commission Energy
website (http://ec.europa.eu/energy/index_en.htm); theWikipedia site on
EU energy-climate package is also very useful (http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/European_Union_climate_and_energy_package).The central proposition in this vigorous campaignwas to
reduce the consumption of all primary sources of energy by
20% by the year 2020, which by every rational account
constituted a remarkable stretch ofwishful ‘green’ thinking.
Even the International Energy Agency (IEA), which advo-
cates a profound revision of the current pattern of energy
consumption, dismisses it and assumes that the demand for
natural gas in the EU will go up from 508 bcm in 2009 to
593 bcm in 2020.25 Indeed, the vision of ever-reducing
emissions ignores the fact that previous gains in energy
efﬁciency were achieved thanks to deindustrialization of
major European economics, and that trend could not
continue indeﬁnitely.26 The needs of the new member
states, such as Poland or Romania, in getting up to the EU
average level of GDP (and energy consumption) per capita
were also conveniently forgotten. The directives aimed at
massive increase of investment in alternative and renew-
able energy sources, which even in the most optimistic
designswould remain farmore costly and less economically
efﬁcient than hydrocarbons. The train of hyper-expensive
‘white elephants’ was set in motion right on the verge of
the crisis that would shatter European ﬁnances.
This bold departure from common economic sense
begs for an explanation because it goes against the normal
political process, where elected leaders are reasonably
reluctant to ask the electorate for sacriﬁces – and to step
on the major corporate interests – for the sake of results
that may or may not materialize 20–30 years from now. In
contrast, Russia’s behavior in the conﬂict with Ukraine,
while deﬁnitely self-defeating, is consistent with what
could be expected from a ‘petro-state’ that has developed
a highly inﬂated perception of itself because of the
seemingly unlimited rise of oil revenues.27 This author
possesses little insight on the decision-making in the
‘Berlaymont corridors’, but he ﬁnds it difﬁcult to believe
that Eurocrats have collectively converted into the ‘Save-
the-planet’ faith. It doesn’t take a ‘skeptical environmen-
talist’ to ﬁgure out that the money channeled into bio-
fuels and wind farms would have paid far greater divi-
dend if invested in conversion of power generators from
coal to gas.28 The costly victory of bureaucratic strate-
gizing that hijacked the populist cause of arresting the
unstoppable and unpredictable climate change was facili-
tated by the political predisposition to treating energy
business as security challenge.3.1. Case 2: pipeline race in the southern corridor
A particularly telling example of futility of the ‘energy
security’ hyper-activity in the second half of the 2000s can
be found in the interplay of political ambitions focused on25 These ﬁgures refer to the ‘New Policies Scenario’, which is more
energy-efﬁcient than the ‘Current Policies Scenario’; see World Energy
Outlook, 2011, p. 159.
26 It is ironic indeed that EU Commissioner for Energy Günther Oet-
tinger now argues that high taxes on energy were pushing Germany
towards deindustrialization; see Stratmann (2011).
27 Sound analysis of this behavioral pattern is in Goldman (2008).
28 The well-researched work that irks the climate-warriors no end is
Lomborg (2007).
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supposed to bring gas from the wider Caspian area to
consumers in South-Eastern Europe.29 The idea of
increasing the inﬂow of ‘new gas’ went clearly against the
ideology of reducing the consumption of hydrocarbons but
was nevertheless embraced by the European Commission
as the materialization of the diversiﬁcation guideline. The
key asset in this corridor was supposed to be the Nabucco
pipeline, which was described by Andris Piebalgs, former
EU Commissioner for Energy, as ‘an embodiment of the
existence of a common European energy policy.’30 The
project enjoys the most favored status in the EU Commis-
sion, but the consortium of six energy companies has been
unable to get it off the ground.31
A noisy trans-Atlantic lobby sought to reproduce the
success story of the BTC pipeline but all the encouragement
could not convince the partners (of which only the German
RWE had money to put into the project) in the proﬁtability
of their enterprise.32 The key problem was not the high
cost of construction but the scarcity of supply sources since
the Shah Deniz off-shore ﬁled in Azerbaijan developed by
Statoil and BP would not ﬁll a half of the planned pipe.
Hopes were pinned primarily on Turkmenistan, and the EU
leaders went to great length courting President Gurman-
guly Berdymukhammedov, while Moscow engaged in
furious counter-intrigues. The competition was entirely
surrealistic because that the project that was implemented
swiftly and elegantly was the gas pipeline from the Amu-
Darya gas-ﬁelds to China. Many experts were inclined to
see that breakthrough as a setback for Russia’s strategy of
dominating the Central Asia but in fact, Moscow aban-
doned its ambition for purchasing all gas from
Turkmenistan and was only aiming at preventing its export
to Europe (Aliyev, 2009).33
Gazprom expressed enthusiasm about the idea of
opening a new route to the European market and insisted
that the best way to go about was to construct the South
Stream pipeline across the Black Sea avoiding transit
through both Ukraine and Turkey. The Nabucco lobby
excoriated this project as a means to increase the EU
dependence upon Russian gas, while in fact hardly any new
volumes were contracted by Gazprom, which sought
primarily to blackmail Ukraine. The competition appeared
ﬁerce but the economic crisis compelled some cost-
efﬁciency checks of the energy fantasies, so in 2011, the
Nabucco consortium announced another postponement of
the investment decision, which attracted little attention in
Brussels and caused no jubilation in Moscow, since the29 For an early draft of this plan, see Energy Corridors (2007).
30 Debates on a common European foreign policy on energy in the
European Parliament, in which this description was mentioned, can be
accessed at (http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef¼-//
EP//TEXTþCREþ20070925þITEM-015þDOCþXMLþV0//EN).
31 For more elaborate analysis of this case, see Baev and Øverland (2010).
32 One example of the expert advocacy for the Nabucco project is Cornell
and Nilsson (2008); a more sober perspective in Barysch (2010).
33 In-depth analysis of the Caspian energy prospects can be found in
chapters 16–18 of the World Energy Outlook, 2010.
34 On the far from successful presentation of the South Stream project in
Brussels, see Belikov (2011a); on the preferences of oil ‘majors’ working in
Azerbaijan, see Hulbert (2011).much-advertised South Stream was also delayed.34 The
architects of the new ‘corridor’ have to reckon with the
reality of non-existence of reliable sources of gas in the
Caspian area (at least as long as Iran remains off-limits),
and their designs for ‘geopolitical’ pipelines are re-
categorized as far-fetched extravaganza.4. Into the new decade: what energy security?
The saturation of the European energy market in the
wake of the economic crisis has taken the EU policy-
planners as much by surprise as the emergence of a gas
glut has caught the Kremlin market analysts ﬂat-footed.
The issue is not that the risks to energy supply have
temporarily diminished but that the whole conceptual
framework for making energy policy has become unusable.
The turning point on which the ‘energy security’ topic has
gone out of vogue was the shocking ﬁasco of the UN
Climate Summit in Copenhagen in December 2009, which
in retrospect looks over-determined (Müller, 2010). The EU
leaders tried to stick to the collective platform that was far
more radical than what China and the US were ready to
subscribe to. When the commitment to reach a legally
binding agreement collapsed, the European leaders and
bureaucrats discovered that their pledges and plans for
a ‘low-carbon future’ had a feeble economic foundation.
Indeed, as ‘rescue packages’ for Greece are grudgingly
collected, politicians of all persuasions have to internalize
the fact that their energy pet-projects are to be downsized
in the dawning era of budget austerity.
The ambitious goals for non-carbon future are still
maintained, but funding for wind farms and solar panels is
curtailed, so the proposition for constructing a ‘gas bridge’ to
the ideal energy balance formed by alternative and renew-
able sources is gaining prominence in the ofﬁcial EU
discourse. Estimating the size of this ‘bridge’ as stretching
beyond the short horizon of political thought, the IEA raised
the question: ‘Are we entering the golden age of gas?’35 An
afﬁrmative answer has become more probable due to the
massive fall-out from the Fukushima disaster in Japan in
March 2011, which determined a severe reduction of pros-
pects for nuclear industry in Europe, and particularly in
Germany (Fukushima fears, 2011). Russia is very keen to
capitalize on this answer counting on new long-term
contracts rather than on the appearance of a real market for
gaswith spot pricesﬂuctuating independently of oil prices.36
President Medvedev assumed that he made Chancellor
Merkel an offer she couldn’t refuse at the annual consul-
tations in Hannover in July 2011, and was quite taken aback
when she ﬂatly turned down the proposition for adding
another trunk to the Nord Stream and asserted that an
increase in import of gas was out of the question.37Merkel’s
insistence on the strategy centered on renewables is35 A special IEA report under the same title was produced in mid-2011,
see (http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/golden_age_gas.asp).
36 On the Russian expectations, see Hoedt (2011).
37 That affront is clearly spelled in the summary of talks at the ofﬁcial
website of the Chancellery (http://www.bundeskanzlerin.de/Content/EN/
Artikel/__2011/07/2011-07-19-dt-rus-regierungskonsultationen__en.html).
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tages of the buyers’ market where extra volumes could be
sold only if ﬂexibility in pricing is shown. Germany is in the
lead in putting pressure on Gazprom, but in this hard bar-
gaining the big issue of energy security is all but irrele-
vant.38 Much the same way, Poland is playing up the
proposition for developing shale gas (knowing full well that
it is problematic even in the mid-term) in order to get
a better deal with Russia on import and transit, which is
threatened by the Nord Stream (Smolar, 2011).
There is always a possibility that another spasm in the
Russian–Ukrainian gas conﬂict, which is by no means
resolved by the election of President Victor Yanukovich in
January 2010, could bring back the demands to treat energy
supply as a national security matter. With the opening of
the Nord Stream, constructing of several inter-connector
pipelines and building of gas reserves, the real economic
impact of an interruptionwould beminimal, so the political
excitement is certain to be short-lived. In real terms, it is the
ﬁscal solvency that is set to remain the major challenge to
the EU very existence, and the energy bills constitute
a signiﬁcant part of this challenge, particularly since the
most affected economies (Greece, Italy, Spain) happen to be
severely energy-deﬁcient and have no alternative to
increasing dependence on import of natural gas. They must
lead in eliminating the subsidies to the cost-inefﬁcient
‘renewables’, but their best hope is in a healthy fall of oil
prices, which is certain to push Russia into a ﬁnancial and
political meltdown.41 Putin has ordered Gazprom to make the investment decision by the
end of 2011 but made no promises on tax breaks; see Belikov (2011b).
42 The 50-50 deal was far from popular among Russian patriotically-4.1. Case 3: the false start of a race to the Arctic resources
It was the Russian ﬂag-planting expedition to the North
Pole in summer 2007 that triggered a surge in political
strategizing for the Arctic region, and the increasing
accessibility of the presumed hydrocarbon riches has been
a major driver of policy-making.39 From the very start, this
‘re-discovery’ of the Arctic had a pronounced geopolitical
content created primarily by Russia’s more assertive
political course set by Putin’s famous ‘Munich speech’ in
February 2007. This pseudo-revisionist behavior, which
culminated in the August 2008 war with Georgia, gener-
ated the perception that the competition for the resources
hidden under the waters and melting ice of the Arctic
Ocean would acquire confrontational character.40 That
perception has sincemostly evaporated as the littoral states
have demonstrated their commitment to play by the rules,
but the programs for building capabilities for operations in
the Northern ‘theatre’ are still being implemented in the
armed forces of Canada, Russia and the US.
It is analytically interesting that the great anxiety about
the forthcoming Arctic ‘resource conﬂicts’ blossomed with
no connection to the estimates of extraction costs on the
already evaluated oil- and gas-ﬁelds. This is particularly38 On the price squeeze, see Kulikov (2011). On the commitment to the
highly problematic ‘green agenda’, see Westerwelle (2011).
39 My earlier examination of this case is in Baev (2010b).
40 The most citied anticipation of ‘an armed mad dash for its resources’
is Borgerson (2008).typical for Russia, which has started the development of
two gas mega-projects on the Yamal peninsular and in the
Barents Sea (Shtokman) and one medium-size oil project in
the Kara Sea (Prirazlomnoe). All three are experiencing
delays and/or have run into cost escalation problems, and
the increased political attention to the High North has not
helped at all in advancing the development. The Shtokman
project is supposed to be a pilot enterprise as a joint off-
shore venture, in which Gazprom has a controlling stake,
but Total and Statoil insist in postponing the investment
decision (currently into 2012) until it is possible to
establish the proﬁtability of production within reasonable
doubt.41 Quite possibly, the desire to create a strong
momentum for the Shtokman project was one of the
incentives for Moscow to settle for a compromise solution
for the maritime border dispute with Norway announced
sensationally during President Medvedev’s visit to Oslo in
April 2010.42 The momentum, nevertheless, has not
materialized.
This new treaty constitutes proof positive for the
proposition that the stake-holders recognize the impera-
tive of joint work on the Arctic problems; it also shows that
the appetites of international ‘majors’ for the as yet
undiscovered reserves of oil and gas in this region are in
fact very limited. It remains to be seen whether Canada,
Denmark and Russia would ﬁnd a way to harmonize their
interests in expanding their exclusive economic zones and
submit conﬂict-free claims – or perhaps a joint one – to the
UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf.43
Whether the ﬁve littoral states ﬁnd a consensus on
dividing the Arctic seabed or not, it is already clear
that securitization of the energy agenda, which remains
limited to a few long-prepared projects, has been entirely
nonsensical.5. Conclusion
This analysis might appear to be too heavily tilted in the
European direction, while the big story in energy demand,
and in particularly in natural gas consumption, is
happening in Asia-Paciﬁc with China playing the lead
character in this story. The reason for this Euro-centrism is
essential to the central argument of this investigation: It is
in Europe that some crucial decisions that have heavy
impact on the global gas market were made in the second
half of the past decade. The economic fundamentals
underpinning these decisions have since shifted radically,
so the whole set of energy directives is now pointing in
a totally wrong direction.minded politicians but criticism was not allowed in the mainstream
media; see Kalashnikov (2011).
43 As of mid-2011, 56 claims were submitted to this Commission, and 14
recommendations were issued, including the one from June 2002 to re-
submit the Russian claim with more solid evidence; all documentation
can be accessed at its website (http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/
commission_submissions.htm).
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urgent revision of the EU goals and resources is limited to
the ﬁnancial sector, while the energy policy is left in its own
bureaucratic ‘box’. The content of this policy-making is
certain to be changed in due – and not very distant – time
because secure access to affordable energy supplies could
play an important role in easing the ﬁnancial spasm and
setting the most damaged EU economies on the recovery
track. The absolute priority in the reshaped energy policy
would have to be placed on cutting down the expenses, so
despite the aggressive lobbying from ‘green’ interest
groups subsidies for ‘renewables’ would have to be cur-
tailed. That will bring natural gas to the center of the EU
energy planning, and the key task will necessarily be the
utilization of the advantages of the gas ‘glut’ situation,
which is set to last for months andmaybe years to come, for
pushing the prices down.
Russia is – as of late 2011 – less directly affected by the
severe crisis of European ﬁnances, but the rethinking of its
energy policy goals is no less necessary – and is also
lagging. Oil is set to remain the main money-maker for the
federal budget, and with the opening of the East Siberia –
Paciﬁc Ocean (VSTO) pipeline, Russia has successfully
diversiﬁed its oil export. In the gas sector, however, this
proposition has made little progress, with the obvious
exception of the Sakhalin projects, and the prospects are
not very promising. Gazprom cannot – and is hardly going
to – ﬁnd is Asia-Paciﬁc customers prepared to accept long-
term contracts tied to oil prices, so its negotiations with
China are fruitless. Russia is set to remain locked in the
European gas market, but it is very slow in adjusting to the
irreversible changes in this market.
The discrepancy between the shifts in the global
energy markets and the political perceptions of the
consequences related to particular dependencies on
supply from Russia and demand in Europe determines the
instability of gas relations between these two major
counter-parts. The notion of ‘energy security’ will, there-
fore, remain relevant, but interpretation of risks in gas
trade as national security threats, so common in the
2000s, is unhelpful in accepting the prospect that Russia
will remain the main gas supplier to the EU and would
probably increase its share on this market. Putin’s Gaz-
prom is indeed a maverick, not least due to its irreducible
inefﬁciency (though the SOCAR in Azerbaijan and Kaz-
MunaiGaz in Kazakhstan are hardly any better), and its
probable quarrels with customers might resonate far
beyond the point of impact.
One negative consequence of these quarrels is that the
natural gas is acquiring a reputation of inherently trou-
blesome energy source, which affects the market and
hampers the replacement of coal – the single most
important change in the world energy balance from the
point of view of local environmental degradation and
global warming. Another consequence is the procrasti-
nation in development of many ‘green ﬁelds’ in Russia
(such as Kovykta north of the Lake Baikal) due to the lack
of investment and deterioration of investment climate
caused by a very special kind of securitized ‘resource
nationalism’ typical for the Putin regime. Yet another
consequence is reinforcement of the EU persistence inproceeding to a ‘non-carbon future’, despite the increas-
ingly obvious shallowness of its pretensions for leader-
ship in minimizing emission. Both Russia and the EU
remain essentially in denial that the time for energy
-geopolitical games around the small north-western
corner of Eurasia is coming to an end; the nexus of
energy ﬂows is fast shifting to Asia-Paciﬁc, and while
Russia can connect with this trend, the EU will have to
work hard to prove its relevance.Acknowledgments
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